


The Global Eradication of Smallpox: what should we have learned

John C. Cutler Memorial Lecture


D.A. Henderson, MD, MPH
Professor of Medicine and Public Health

Pittsburgh
24 September 2007

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The tale of smallpox eradication


- The beginning -- January 1967
The target -- December 1976
 - Last case -- October 26, 1977
- A program that almost wasn't launched, was forecast to fail, but miraculously succeeded

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Efforts to eradicate a human disease


• Hookworm	1909-23	14 years
	Treatment: latrines	
	52 countries	
• Yellow fever	1915-32	17 years
	<i>Aedes aegypti</i> control	
• Yaws	1948-66	18 years
	Penicillin	
• Malaria	1955-73	18 years
	DDT	



Common features: No surveillance; no research program



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Characteristics of Smallpox Favoring Eradication

- Man -- the only host
- Virus spread -- during rash only
-- face-to-face contact
- Permanent immunity after recovery
- Highly stable vaccine requiring one dose

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




Smallpox as a target

- 1953 – Director General proposal to the World Health Assembly
 - “...a practical world program, of importance and value to every country...demonstrating the importance of WHO to every Member State”

Rejected as being uneconomical and unfeasible
 Prominent in opposition – U.K. and U.S.

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
Global eradication program approved

- 1958 USSR Vice-Minister Victor Zhdanov
 - Proposed a program of mass vaccination to achieve global eradication
- 1959 -1967
 - Budget of <\$100,000 per year
 - One staff member in HQ and 5 in the field

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
WHO's "intensified" program - 1967

- Director-General to submit plan for an "intensified" program-1966
- Plan- 10 year program; budget of \$US 2.4 million/year
- Objections by delegates
 - Not feasible
 - Demand for no further increases in WHO budget
- 58 votes needed to accept the proposal; 60 votes received

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Program leadership

- Director General -- confident that program will fail with loss of credibility in WHO
- Demand for an American Director
 - The identified candidate declines:
 - Major responsibilities for new CDC African program
 - Budget too small to purchase vaccine needed
 - Only <\$50,000 each for 50 countries
 - The appointment

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The Challenge



- Global status of smallpox – 1967
 - 10,000,000 – 15,000,000 cases
 - 2,000,000 deaths
 - 43 countries reported cases
 - Population of endemic areas > one billion
- Program staff
 - Headquarters – 4 medical, 2 admin, 3 secretaries
 - Regions – one each in 4 WHO Regions
 - International staff – never more than 150


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The Strategy

- Vaccination
 - Target – 80% of population
 - Quality control
- Surveillance-containment
 - Surveillance – weekly report from every health center and hospital
 - Containment teams to do "ring vaccination"
 - Quality control


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- ### Critical final challenges
- India- 1973
 - National search and containment
 - Many staff for 3 to 6 month assignment
 - Bangladesh – August 1975
 - Only remaining area with variola major
 - Civil war, floods, and famine
 - Health services are reorganized
 - President and family are assassinated
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- ### Critical final challenges
- Ethiopia—1974-75
 - Marxist revolution
 - Civil war in three areas
 - Few roads and limited staff
 - Somalia – Summer 1977
 - The only remaining endemic country
 - Nomadic, minimal health infrastructure
 - Variola minor patients readily able to move about
 - The time of the Haj was approaching
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
- ### Critical components of international programs
- what I believe we learned
- Surveillance and containment
 - Surveillance – epidemiology in action
 - Incidence – indicator of progress
 - Identification of groups or areas at risk
 - How disease spreads
 - Continuing adaptation of tactics to circumstances
 - Containment
 - Targeted control where disease occurs
- Played no role in past failed eradication programs*
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Critical components of international programs what I believe we learned

- Research
 - Field- epidemiology, operations, social sciences
 - Manufacturing
 - Laboratory
 - Continuing questions
 - What would make the task easier, faster, less costly, more certain of success

Why have public health professionals been so resistant to research?

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


Critical components of international programs what I believe we learned

- Quality control is an intrinsic part of an effective program
 - Vaccines, pharmaceuticals, bed nets, etc
 - Success in obtaining adequate distribution

One of the most ignored precepts in program operations

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Wrong assumptions - vaccine

- Available supplies would be adequate
- Quality of vaccine is essential
 - Quality control labs (Canada and Netherlands)
 - Less than 10% met accepted standards
 - Budget-too small to permit vaccine purchase
- Development of vaccine production
 - Research to do manual and training



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Solutions for the vaccine problem

- Change vaccination procedures to use less vaccine - Research
 - Jet injector gun
- Bifurcated needle
 - One-fourth as much vaccine required
 - Training time-15 minutes
 - Vaccinations successful in 95%+
 - Needles can be easily sterilized and reused
 - Cost -- \$5 per thousand


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Wrong assumptions

- Revaccination required every 5 to 10 years
 - Surveillance shows almost all cases are unvaccinated
- Smallpox spreads "like a prairie fire"
 - Surveillance shows a patient usually infects few others
 - From onset, most patients are sick and go to bed


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A legacy of smallpox eradication Expanded Program on Immunization EPI

- WHO international conference-PAHO 1970
 - Wards full of children with vaccine-preventable diseases
 - High productivity of smallpox vaccination teams
- Expanded Program on Immunization adopted by World Health Assembly -- 1974
 - Smallpox, DTP, measles, polio
- Special support by UNICEF and Rotary
 - Target: 80% coverage by 1990 (~5% in 1975)


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
Immunization in the Americas

- 1977 EPI began – Director, Ciro de Quadros
- 1985 PAHO– Polio eradication
 - Development of a surveillance network
 - Development of a lab network
- 2008 – Ten antigens
 - >90% coverage -- DPT, polio, BCG, measles, rubella, H. influenzae b, hepatitis B, (rotavirus)
 - Yellow fever in endemic and at-risk areas
- Vaccine expenditures/ year –
>\$2,000 million – 95 % from national budgets

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
Number of Reported Paralytic Poliomyelitis Cases and OPV3 Coverage in Children <1 Year of Age Region of the Americas, 1968-2004*



* Type 1 vaccine derived virus in 2000 and 2001: 21 cases

* Date as of 27 August 2004

Impact of Measles and Rubella Elimination Strategies, The Americas, 1980–2008*



Source: CEPIS 1990's
* Rubella = number of U.S. cases required to produce 1000 cases of congenital rubella syndrome (CRS)



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What we should have learned.....

- Commitment of countries before programs begin
 - Strategy
 - Plan and budget
 - Practical demonstration of efficacy
- Surveillance system
- Systems for quality control of vaccines or drugs and success in delivery
- Research program

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