1. Smallpox vaccination should be discontinued in every country except for investigators at special risk.
2. International smallpox vaccination certificates should no longer be required of any travellers.
3. Sufficient freeze-dried smallpox vaccine to vaccinate 200 million people should be maintained by WHO in refrigerated depots in two countries, together with stocks of bifurcated needles.
4. The stored vaccine should be periodically tested for potency.
5. Seed lots of vaccinia virus suitable for the preparation of smallpox vaccine should be maintained in designated WHO collaborating centres.
6. National health authorities that have vaccine stocks should be asked to inform WHO of the amount of vaccine maintained.
7. In order to maintain public confidence in the fact of global eradication, it is important that rumours of suspected smallpox, which can be expected to occur in many countries, should be thoroughly investigated. Information should be provided to WHO, if requested, so that it can be made available to the world community.
8. WHO should maintain an effective system to coordinate and participate in the investigation of suspected smallpox cases throughout the world. The international smallpox rumour register should be maintained.
9. No more than four WHO collaborating centres should be approved as suitable to hold and handle stocks of variola virus. A collaborating centre would be approved only if it had adequate containment facilities. Each such centre should report relevant information on their safety measures annually to WHO and be inspected periodically by WHO.
10. Other laboratories should be asked to destroy any stocks of variola virus that they hold, or transfer them to an approved WHO collaborating centre.
11. In collaboration with country health services, WHO should organize and assist a special surveillance programme on human monkeypox, its epidemiology, and its ecology in areas where it is known to have occurred. The programme should continue until 1985, when a further assessment of the situation the should be made.
12. WHO should continue to encourage and coordinate research on orthopoxviruses.
13. WHO should maintain the system of WHO collaborating centres for carrying out diagnostic work and research on orthopoxviruses.
14. Research workers who do not work in a WHO collaborating centre and who wish to carry out experiments with variola or whitepox virus that are approved by the appropriate WHO committee should be offered the use of the special facilities in a WHO collaborating centre.
15. Research on poxviruses other than variola or whitepox viruses should not be performed under circumstances where there is any possibility of cross-contamination with these two agents.
16. WHO should ensure that appropriate publications are produced describing smallpox and its eradication and the principles and methods that are applicable to other programmes.
17. All relevant scientific, operational and administrative data should be catalogued and retained for archival purposes in WHO headquarters and perhaps also in several centres interested in the history of medicine.
18. An interregional team consisting of not less than two epidemiologists with past experience in the smallpox eradication campaign, plus supporting staff, should be maintained at WHO headquarters until at least the end of 1985. At least one additional field officer should be assigned to cover areas where human monkeypox is under investigation.
19. WHO should set up a committee on orthopoxvirus infections.
| Year | Title | Authors | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977 | [Global program for liquidating smallpox. II. Scientific-organizational prerequisites for undertaking a program of smallpox liquidation]. Russian | Ladnyi ID | Zh Mikrobiol Epidemiol Immunobiol 1977 (10):29-33 | |
| 1977 | Progress report on register of laboratories retaining variola virus, 28 July 1977 | S2.180.3 | ||
| 1977 | Report of a Workshop on Safety Measures in Laboratories Retaining Variola Virus, Geneva, Switzerland, 1-4 Aug 1977 | SME/77.2 | ||
| 1978 | Laboratories with variola virus stocks | Smallpox unit, WHO | SME/78.25 | |
| 1979 | Report of meeting of officials from laboratories retaining variola virus and national control authorities concerned, 23-24 April 1979 | WHO/SE/79.137 | ||
| 1979 | WER. Safety standards in smallpox laboratories | WHO | WER 12 Jan 1979 54(2):13 | |
| 1979 | WER. Laboratories retaining virus | WHO | WER 19 Jan 1979 54(3):23 | |
| 1979 | Report of Consultation on the Justification for Retention and Use of Variola Virus in the Post Eradication Era | WHO/SE/79.135 | ||
| 1979 | Editorial: Should the smallpox virus be allowed to survive? | Foege WH | N Engl J Med 1979 300(12):670-1 | |
| 1987 | Letter: Stocks of variola virus | Henderson DA | Am J Public Health 1987 77(2): 238-239 | OPEN |
| 1994 | Destruction of variola virus: Memorandum. Based on the report of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections, Geneva, 9 Sep 1994 | WHO | Bull World Health Organ 1994 72(6):841-844 | OPEN |
| 1999 | Chronology of events related to variola virus destruction | Unknown | DA Henderson personal papers | |
| 2001 | WER. Retention of variola virus stocks | WHO | WER 11 May 2001 76(19):142-5 | |
| 2001 | Recent events and observations pertaining to smallpox virus destruction in 2002. | Henderson DA, Fenner F. | Clin Infect Dis 2001 33(7): 1057-1059. | |
| Executive Board and World Health Assembly | ||||
| 1996 | Executive Board, 97th Session, Jan 1996 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Director-General | EB97/14 | |||
| – Resolution EB27.R24: Destruction of variola virus stocks [Recommends destruction on 30 June 1999] |
EB97.R24 | |||
| 49th World Health Assembly, May 1996 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Director-General | A49/5 | |||
| – Resolution WHA49.10. Destruction of variola virus stocks [Recommends destruction of variola virus stocks on 30 June 1999] |
WHA49.10 | |||
| 1999 | 52nd World Health Assembly, May 1999 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A52/5 | |||
| – Resolution WHA52.10. Destruction of variola virus stocks [Strongly reaffirms decision to destroy variola virus stocks but authorizes retention until 2002] |
WHA52.10 | |||
| 2000 | Executive Board, 106th Session, Jan 2000 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB106/3 | |||
| 53rd World Health Assembly, May 2000 | ||||
| – Temporary retention of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A53/27 | |||
| 2001 | 55th World Health Assembly, May 2001 | |||
| – Temporary retention of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A54/16 | |||
| 2002 | Executive Board,109th Session, Jan 2002 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB109/17 | |||
| 55th World Health Assembly, May 2002 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A55/21 | |||
| – Resolution WHA 55.15. Destruction of variola virus stocks [Authorizes retention of variola virus stocks until research status allows consensus on destruction date] |
WHA55.15 | |||
| 2003 | Executive Board, 111th Session, Jan 2003 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB111/5 | |||
| 56th World Health Assembly, May 2003 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A56/14 | |||
| 2004 | Executive Board, 113th Session, Jan 2004 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB113/34 | |||
| 57th World Health Assembly, May 2004 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A57/7 | |||
| 2005 | 58th World Health Assembly, May 2005 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A58/10 | |||
| 2006 | Executive Board, 117th Session, Jan 2006 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB117/33 | |||
| 60th World Health Assembly, May 2006 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A59/10 | |||
| 2007 | Executive Board, 120th Session, Jan 2007 | |||
| – Resolution EB120.R8: Destruction of variola virus stocks [Strongly reaffirms decision to destroy variola virus stocks but reaffirms need for consensus on destruction date when research crucial to improved public-health outbreak response permits. Requests Director-General to conduct, in 2009-10, a major review of research so that 64th World Health Assembly (2010) may reach consensus.] |
EB120.R8 | |||
| 60th World Health Assembly, May 2007 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A60/9 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. 8th meeting of the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research. Report by the Secretariat | 60th World Health Assembly, | A60/40 | ||
| – Resolution WHA60.1: Destruction of variola virus stocks [Strongly reaffirms decision to destroy variola virus stocks but reaffirms need for consensus on destruction date. Destruction of variola virus will be a substantive agenda item for 64th World Health Assembly (2010).] |
A60/R1 | |||
| 2008 | 61st World Health Assembly, May 2008 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A61/6 | |||
| 2010 | Executive Board, 126th Session, Jan 2010 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB126/18 | |||
| 63rd World Health Assembly, May 2010 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A63/19 | |||
| 2011 | Executive Board, 128th Session, Jan 2011 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB128/12 | |||
| 65th World Health Assembly, May 2011 | ||||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A64/17 | |||
| 2014 | Executive Board, 134th Session, Jan 2014 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | EB134/34 | |||
| 2014 | 67th World Health Assembly, May 2014 | |||
| – Destruction of variola virus stocks. Report by the Secretariat | A67/37 | |||
| Year | Title | Authors | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1980 | Conference on the Surveillance of Monkeypox and Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers, Brazzaville, Congo, 28 Apr-3 May 1980 | |||
| – A system of surveillance for monkeypox and haemorrhagic fever | McCormick JB | SME/80.6 | ||
| – [Biological security measures]. French | Oviatt VR | SME/80.8 | ||
| WHO Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections, Geneva, Switzerland | ||||
| 1982 | Report of the 1st meeting, 3-5 Mar 1982 | WHO/SE/82.160 | OPEN | |
| 1983 | Report of the 2nd meeting, 15-17 Mar 1983 | WHO/SE/83.161 | ||
| 1984 | Report of the 3rd meeting, 28-30 Mar 1984 | WHO/SE/84.162 | OPEN | |
| 1986 | Report of the 4th meeting, 24-26 Mar 1986 | SE/86.163 | OPEN | |
| Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections, Geneva, Switzerland | ||||
| 1990 | Report of the meeting, 11-13 Dec 1990 | CDS/SME/91.1 | OPEN | |
| 1994 | Report of the meeting, 9 Sep 1994 | WHO/CDS/BVI/94.3 | OPEN | |
| 1995 | Report by the Director General to the 95th Session of the Executive Board, Jan 1995 | EB95/33 | OPEN | |
| 1999 | Report of the meeting, 14-15 Jan 1999 | WHO/CDS/CSR/99.1 | OPEN | |
| 2004 | Report of the meeting, 31 Aug - 1 Sep 2004 | WHO/CDS/CSR/ARO/2004.3 | OPEN | |
| WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research | ||||
| 1999 | Report of a WHO meeting, 6-9 Dec 1999 | WHO/CDS/CSR/2000.1 | ||
| 2000 | WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research | WER 11 Feb 2000 75(6):45-8 | ||
| 2001 | Report of the 2nd Meeting, 15-16 Feb 2001 | WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/2001.17 | ||
| 2001 | Report of the 3rd Meeting, 3-4 Dec 2001 | WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2002.3 | ||
| 2002 | Report of the 4th Meeting, 20-21 Nov 2002 | WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2003.5 | ||
| 2004 | Report of the 6th Meeting, 4-5 Nov 2004 | WHO/CDS/CSR/ARO/2005.4 | ||
| 2006 | Report of the 8th Meeting, 16-17 Nov 2006 | WHO/CDS/EPR/2007.1 | ||
| 2007 | Report of the 9th Meeting, 29-30 Nov 2007 | WHO/HSE/EPR/2008.1 | ||
| 2008 | Report of the 10th Meeting, 19-20 Nov 2008 | WHO/HSE/EPR/2008.9 | ||
| 2009 | Report of the 11th Meeting, 4-5 Nov 2009 | WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2009.3 | ||
| 2010 | Report of the 12th Meeting, 17-18 Nov 2010 | WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.5 | ||
| 2010 | Scientific review of variola virus research, 1999-2010 [Requested by 60th World Health Assembly, June 2007] |
WHO | WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.3 | |
| 2010 | Comments on the scientific review of variola virus research, 1999-2010 | Advisory Group of Independent Experts to review the smallpox research programme (AGIES) | WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.4 | |
| 2011 | Report of the 13th Meeting, 31 Oct-1 Nov 2011 | WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2011.2 | ||
| 2012 | Report of the 14th Meeting, 16-17 Oct 2012 | WHO/HSE/PED/CED/2013.1 | ||
| 2013 | Report of the 15th Meeting, 24-25 Sep 2013 | WHO/HSE/PED/CED/2013.2 | ||
| 2013 | Report to the World Health Organization | Advisory Group of Independent Experts to review the smallpox research programme (AGIES) | WHO/HSE/PED/CED/2013.3 | |
| 2014 | Report of the 16th Meeting, 20-21 Oct 2014 | WHO/HSE/PED/CED/2015.2 | ||
| Year | Title | Authors | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1978 | Smallpox vaccine stocks | Smallpox unit, WHO | SME/78.22 | |
| 1980 | Management of reserve stocks of vaccine in the post-smallpox eradication era | Smallpox unit, WHO | WHO/SE/80.158 Rev 1 | |
| 2005 | Global smallpox vaccine reserve. Report by the Secretariat | Executive Board, 115th Session, Jan 2005 ? | EB115/36 | |
| 2005 | Smallpox: Global smallpox vaccine reserve. Report by the Secretariat | 58th World Health Assembly, May 2005 | A58/9 |
| Year | Title | Authors | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1980 | Management of suspected cases of smallpox in the post-eradication period | Smallpox unit, WHO | WHO/SE/80.157 Rev 1 | |
| 1980 | The confirmation and maintenance of smallpox eradication | Breman JG, Arita I | WHO/SE/80.156 | |
| 1981 | Report of meeting on the implementation of post-smallpox eradication policy | WHO/SE/81.159 | ||
| 1983 | Smallpox eradication surveillance Seventh general programme of work covering the period 1984-1989 | SME/MTP/83.1 | ||
| 1987 | Tasks in the wake of smallpox eradication | Z Ježek | World Health Forum 1987 8:293-6 | |
| 1987 | Can smallpox return? | F Fenner | World Health Forum 1987 8:297-304 |